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IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE STATE OF UTAH
In the Matter of the Estate of THOMAS
FAIRCLOUGH PIERPONT,
Deceased
TRACY-COLLINS TRUST COMPANY,
and VILATE P. DEVINE,
Appellants,
-vs.-

Case No.
9022

MARGUERITE GESSFORD PIERPONT
and ELLA P. MEYER,
Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT, ELLA P. MEYER

STATEMENT OF THE GASE
This is the brief of respondent, Ella P. Meyer only.
She is the sister of the testator. (R. 278) Throughout
'this entire proceeding, she has refused as best she could to
become embroiled in a quarrel between the immediate
family of the testator, and the respondent, Marguerite
Gessford Pierpont. (R. 347, 364; Tr. 4, 22) Because of
the peculiar grouping of paragraphs in her brother's will,
Mrs. Meyer is caught in the family controversy. She desires still to remain aloof, and simply state her case for
recovery of an annuity provided her by Mr. Pierpont, a
brother who clearly had taken care of her in the past, and
intended to do so after his death.
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Appellants' statement of the case is substantially
correct, and we will not burden the court with restatement, except to emphasize that this controversy has its
origin in trustee, Tracy Collins Trust Co. petitioning the
trial court for construction of the will. (R. 277) Mrs.
Meyer appeared throughout the matter thereafter, and
asserted her right to receive the annuity, and claimed
interest thereon for arrears. (R. 346, 353; Tr. 6, 13, 20)
She was granted judgment against the trustee for
the sum of $3,713.16 down to the date the final decree
bears. (R. 471) It is for that amount, plus her costs, and
interest down to the date that sum is paid, for which she
contends and for none other.
The research of Mrs. Meyer's counsel has not been
done in connection with or in any way associated with
respondent, Marguerite Gessford Pierpont. The able
brief of her counsel represents an independent work. We
do not refer to cases there cited. We deem the most important foreign case to be found, cited in both respondents' briefs, to be In re PLATT'S ESTATE, 131 P 2d
825. We present our own independent approach and
research. We come to the same answer.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Mrs. Meyer does not contest the facts as stated by
appellants' brief. They are sufficiently accurate as to
guide this court in its review.
This only, as supplementary, must be added: On
April 8, 1958, Mrs. Meyer was "78 years of age. Her
health is poor. She is in desperate need of the annuity
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Thomas Pierpont provided to be paid in his will." (R.
363) "Mrs. Meyer is old and infirm. She needs the
money her brother, the deceased, set up and provided for
her. If there is further delay, it can have a bad effect
on the health of Mrs. Meyer, and could hasten illness."
(R. 347)
At the hearing on June 30, 1958 before Judge Tuckett, her counsel moved the court to continue the hearing
in order to take testimony concerning testamentary intent. There had just come to his attention that morning
for the first time eighteen to twenty checks for $100
each, two for $200 each, all in monthly payments, made
by the testator immediately prior to his death, in her
favor. Counsel preserved his record, asking that if the
court deemed there was any ambiguity in the will, that
the hearing be recessed or resumed to take testimony.
(Tr. 6, 20.) The court found there was no ambiguity. (R.
462)
In his Findings, Conclusions and Decree, reference
is made to these proffered checks and motion. Their
import must not go unnoticed. (R. 462)
Simply stated, Mrs. Meyer's claim is this: In paragraph Seventh (i) of the will, and from the residuary
estate, the testator made the following bequest:
"From the income of the Trust Estate and, if
insufficient, from the principal thereof, my
Trustee, subject to the provisions of subparagraph (k) of this paragraph SEVENTH, shall
make disbursements as follows:
(2) To my sister ELLA P. MEYER the
sum of One Hundred Dollars ($100.00)
per month during her lifetime."
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Sub-paragraph sub- (k) reads:
"(k) If, at any time the,income of the Trust
Estate is insufficient to meet the payments required to be made by my Trustee, and principal
funds are not available for such purposes, my
Trustee may proportionately reduce the respective payments to be made to the extent required
by the availability of funds; and if necessary,
may suspend further payments until funds become available through income of the Trust Estate or through orderly sale of all or part of the
principal assets. In the event any payments
specified to be made by my Trustee shall be so
reduced or suspended, it is my desire that when
funds become available, any so resulting deficiencies in monthly payments shall be made up. It
is my desire and instruction that my Trustee shall
not sell principal assets at a sacrifice in order to
obtain funds to meet the payments specified in
this will. But it is my desire that when, if and as
required, prinicpal assets shall be converted into
cash or readily salesable securities in order to
enable the Trustee to make the payments specified hereunder, provided that sale of principal
assets can, in the sole judgment and discretion of
the Trustee, be made at a price and in a manner
consistent with sound business judgment."
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE WILL AND THE LAW REQUIRE AFFIRMING
THAT AN ANNUITY IN FAVOR OF MRS. MEYER VESTED
AS OF THE TIME OF DECEDENT'S DEATH, NOT UPON
DISTRIBUTION.
POINT II
THE BEQUEST TO MRS. MEYER WAS IN THE TRUE
NA'TURE OF AN ANNUITY.
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POINT III
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING INTEREST
SHOULD BE PAID FROM DATE OF DEATH.

ARGUMENT
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF STATUTES:
The following statutory provisions are crucial in the
disposition of this case. They are all found in Utah Code
Annotated 1953 :
74-3-1.

CLASSIFICATION OF LEGACIES: ANNUITIES:

"Legacies are distinguished and designated,
according to their nature as follows :
(3) An annuity is a bequest of certain specified sums, periodically ; if the fund or
property out of which they are payable
fails, resort may be had to the general
assets as in a case of a general legacy."
74-3-12. WHEN BEQUEST OF INCOME ACCRUES:
"In case of a bequest of the interest or income of a certain sum or fund, the income accrues
from the testa;tor' s death."
74-3-14. LEGACIES AND ANNUITIES-WHEN
DUE:
"Legacies are due and deliverable at the expiration of one year after the testator's decease.
Annu~ties commence at the testator's dece,ase.''
74-3-15. INTEREST ON LEGACIES:
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"Legacies bear interest from the time when
they are due and payable, except that legacies for
maintenance, or to the testator's widow, bear interest from the testator's decease.''
74-3-16. INTENT GOVERNS FOUR PRECEDING SECTIONS:
"The four preceding sections are in all cases
to be controlled by a testator's express intention."

74-2-25. DISPOSITIONS. VESTING. PRESUMPTIONS:
"Testamentary dispositions, including devises
and bequests to a person on attaining majorty,
are presumed to vest at the testator's death.''

COMMENT ON APPELLANTS' BRIEF:
We do not intend to advert to all of the specious
arguments in appellants' brief but will only argue the
important points. By not referring to the numerous misstatements and false conclusions, let it not be implied
that we agree with their position, for we do not in any
degree. Brevity requires we aim for the mark, and supply
authority. That they have not done.
POINT I
THE WILL AND THE LAW REQUIRE AFFIRMING
THAT AN ANNUITY IN FAVOR OF MRS. MEYER VESTED
AS OF THE TIME OF DECEDENT'S DEATH, NOT UPON
DISTRIBUTION.

The judgment that should be affirmed found that
the trust provisions of the will, paragraph Seventh, (i)
"in connection with all other provisions of the will to
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be in the nature of annuities, and such, said annuities
are to be paid by the trustee commencing at the date
of the death of the deceased... " (R. 468, 470)
Thus, the crucial issue, as stated by appellants at
page 13 of their brief, is a question of the time when
the annuitant Mrs. Meyer's legacy took effect. Without
citing a single case as authority, counsel argue this
time should be upon distribution, not as stated in the
Utah statutes, upon death of the testator.
RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS:
The learned trial judge found his answer In the
statute, after finding Mrs. Meyer had been given an
annuity under the will. If her bequest is in the nature
of an annuity, then 74-3-14 UCA 1953 is controlling, for
it says: "Annuities commence at the testator's decease,"
and it does not say at distribution. The trial judge also
predicated his decision on "An examination of the cases
and the RESTATEMENT of the Law of TRUSTS,"
section 234 thereof being applicable. A partial statement
there is:
"a. Where a trust is created by will and by
the terms of the trust the income is payable to
a beneficiary for a designated period, the beneficiary is entitled to income from the date of the
death of the testator, unless it is otherwise provided in the will."
The will created a trust to pay Mrs. Meyer $100 per
month "during her life," not for a portion thereof remaining after administration and distribution. She fits
the cloth of the Restatement and the statute, exactly.
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UTAH STATUTES:
Furthermore, note the additional statutes that bear
on this question of time:
1. "An annuity is a bequest of certain specified
sums periodically; if the fund or property out of which
they are payable fails, resort may be had to the general
assets as in case of a general legacy." 74-3-1 (3) Mrs.
Meyer fits this definition: the sum is certain. She gets
by the will, first from income, but if insufficient, 7 (i)
instructs the trustee to invade principal. This comports
with the vesting statute quoted. Furthermore, that the
testator instructed delay in payments if sacrifice was
involved, said payments shall be made up as in sub-(k)
does not alter the nature of the annuity. There can be
no escape from the character of the legacy as being in
the full nature of .an annuity.
2. 74-3-12 UCA 1953 says: "In case of a bequest of
the interest or income of a certain sum or fund, the
income accrues from the testator's death." The Testator
in 7 (i) said: "From the income of a trust estate ... "
which puts this legacy in a second statutory instruction
to pay from the date of death. Ordinarily in the cases,
the provision would reach an indeterminate sum that
would be earned as income from the corpus of the trust,
and in that unspecified amount situation, still the annuity would accrue at testator's death. How much more
it should apply in the case of a "specified sum periodically" of $100 per month during her life!
3. 74-3-15 UCA. 1953 says that "Legacies bear inSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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terest from the time when they are due and payable,
except that legacies for maintenance, or to the testator's
widow, bear interest from the testator's decease." The
Utah Legislature has vested a right in Mrs. Meyer to
collect interest from the time section 74-3-14 says the
money is due, to wit, "Annuities commence at the testator's death." Also, if that is not enough statutory authority, the same interest statute says if the legacies are
for maintenance, and this is just that, interest shall
accrue at testator's decease.
CASE LAW:
It is indeed rare that so much statutory authority is
found to evaporate appellants' specious argument. He
did not cite a pertinent case on the subject. That should
show that the statutes of Utah have been so clear that
no reason existed for this court to construe such plain,
unambiguous requirements.
Counsel, finding no law to support them, argues in
brief the intention of the testator. We will stick with the
law and show that the cases throughout the land are
against appellants' position, and will confirm this court
in affirming the lower court.
The closest Utah authority on the subject is In Re
LOWE'S ESTATE, 68 Utah 49, 249 P 128. Eminent
counsel argued, and the court laid down the basic principles that must be applied in this case, or the Lowe
case will be materially weakened, changed. In 1926 this
court construed the statute now found at 74-2-25 UCA
1953, then saying :
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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" ... section 6371, Compiled Laws 1917, which
declares that all testamentary dispositions are
presumed to vest at the testator's death, and from
the fact that there is nothing in the will to indicate
an intention on the part of the testatrix that the
vesting of the bequests and devises made therein
should be postponed beyond her death. We regard
this language as a direction or command from the
testatrix to the trustee, whom she had selected,
to divest itself of the title to the trust property,
which she knew would vest in her trustee at the
moment of her death ... We are therefore of the
opinion that Mrs. Hampton had the right and
power under this will at any time after the death
of her mother, either before or after there had
been distribution of the property in the probate
proceedings, to remove Bankers' Trust Co. from
its trusteeship and to name in its stead Walker
Bros... " p. 133 (emphasis added)
The case squarely shows that the bequest to 1\{rs.
Meyer vested at the date of death of Mr. Pierpont. If
this court promulgates the doctrines asked for by the
appellants, it must do so on no other grounds than a
reversal of the Lowe's Estate case. The testamentary
intent is clear in both cases. At bar, section 7 (i) is
mandatory, using the words "shall make disbursement...
to my sister Ella P. Meyer ... during her lifetime." The
best appellants can wheedle out is that in the subsequent
admonition in 7 (k) there might be a suspension for
avoidance of sacrificing values. More on this later.
The prime determination for this court is to find
whether or not a bequest "in the nature of an annuity"
vests at the time of testator's death, or sometime later,
at distribution of the residuary estate. This court said
it was bound by the Utah statutes, in the Lowe case, to
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find the vesting occurred .at death, not at distribution,
and the same finding must be made now. All of the other
apposite statutes drive to the same result.
We have searched long and hard to find something
squarely in pofut, and have finally discovered .a strong
decisive case is California by its highest court. We have
a right and duty to advert to that state because it was
the source of our own statutes on the subject. Please
refer to DEERINGS CALIFORNIA CODES, Probate,
from pages 315 to 333. The history of that state's enactments will show that .all of Utah's enactments pertinent
were identical, historically. California has since codified
many of its leading decisions, and the same are shown,
with history, beginning at page 333 of that citation.
Utah follows California statutes that are identical!
In our research for apposite cases, among many, we
finally found a District Court of appeal case in California that appellants might have found and used. It
determined the issue favorable to appellants that the
annuity vested only at distribution, and not at death, the
case being IN RE \VATSON'S ESTATE, 90 P 2d 349.
However, Sheppard gave the answer in the subsequent
case of In Re PLATT'S ESTATE, 131 P 2d 825, 1942
therein expressly disapproving the Watson decision.
The Platt decision must be regarded as the leading case
in that jurisdiction, and for any state having the same
statutory enactments. It cleans out a great deal of indecision and conflict, summarily, on facts very similar
to the case at bar.
In the Platt case, testator likewise left personal
property to his widow and son ; then remainder to a
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trustee with directions to pay the widow from the income
of corpus $250 per month until her remarriage. If the
income exceeded that amount, the son came in for a
monthly annuity, with more facts not important. The son
was substantially to get what was left after interim gifts
to his mother, the widow. Problems arose in administration as to the time these annuities accrued, the widow
contending payment accrued as of date of death of testator, the son arguing the date of distribution was the
vesting date. The Trustee, as in the case at bar, asked
the court for instructions, and the lower court found as
Tracy-Collins and Mrs. Devine contend here. In Re
Watson, supra would be a specious authority for the
position taken by the son there and appellants here but
for subsequent debasement. The Supreme Court of California decided once and for all, the date of death of
the testator vested the rights, not the date of distribution\ lit ~reversed the lower courts with an excellent
rational and review of the authorities to guide them out
of the mire! It cites section 234 of the RESTATEMENT
OF TRUSTS with approval, in consonance with the
research of Judge Tuckett. Here are some quotations :
"Unquestionably the rule of the restatement
is based upon sound reasoning. As title to all
testamentary dispositions vests at the testator's
death . . . (codes) the title of the trustee Mr.
Platt's property (testator) vested as of that date
even though the trust estate was residuary in
character. (many cases) As a necessary corollary,
the title of the life tenant (the mother, widow)
also dates from the death of the testator." ...
"But in California there is a statutory rule
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which is determinative of the question raised by
the wife's appeal. Section 160 of the Probate
Code" (and this is identical with 74-3-12 of the
Utah ·Code) "provides that 'In case of a bequest
of the interest or income of a certain sum or fund,
the income accrues from the testator's death'
although this provision is controlled by a testator's express intention. If, therefore, the income
payable to Mrs. Platt is a 'bequest of ... income
of a certain sum of fund' and the testator did not
express a contrary intention, her right to income
from the trust estate accrued at the date of her
husband's death.
"A bequest is 'a gift by will of personal property; a legacy. It is well settled that testamentary
gifts of trust income are 'bequests' (cases) ...
"So as there is no express provision in the
will as to the date from which payment of income
shall accrue, under section 160 of the Probate
Code the rights of both the wife and son to income
under the trust accrue from the date of the testator's death."
The language of the court, referring to the confusion
in California appears at page 827 of 131 P2 as follows:
"The appellate courts of California have not
been consistent in deciding whether payment of
income from a testamentary trust accrues from
the date of the testator's death or from the date
of distribution of the estate to the trustee. In a
majority of cases it has been held that, unless
the testamentary trust was created for the support or maintenance of the beneficiary, the income accrues from the date of distribution."
(cases, including In re Est. Of Watson, 90 P2d
349.)"
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"Apparently the controlling factor in the decision of these cases was the inability of the
beneficiary to compel the payment of any income
prior to the distribution of the trust property to
the trustees. That fact, however, is not determinative of the question for, as has been recently
stated, the rule which precludes a beneficiary
from suing to recover income during the period of
administration relates only to the tiine at which
the trustees may be compelled to make payment,
and does not determine the date at which the right
to income commences. In re Estate of Marre, 114
P2d 586."
So here we have the whole case in a nut shell, decided
in the highest court in California, over-ruling an erroneous line of prior authority, with a rational that must
be followed here because our statutes are the same, and
the logic is identical, to say nothing of the precedent of
the Lowe case decided by this court.
In thinking about the second paragraph above quoted
from the Platt case, in respect to the right of the annuitant to compel payment ahead of distribution, let us
make reference to the case quoted above: In re Estate
of MARRE, 114 P2d 586, in connection with appellants'
argument before and after page 30 of their brief. They
there fall into the confusion of the lower California
courts. Appellants argue that during probate, and while
the Pierpont properties are being judiciously sold, and
not at a sacrifice, that respondents could not have compelled payment, "forced a sale of the trust assets." The
Platt decision, refers to In re Marre 's, supra, and the
latter decision, by the same court, said:
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"It is true that during the administration of
the estate, and prior to distribution of the trust
property to appellatns, the beneficiary could not
have brought action to compel against either the
trustees or the exectuors of the estate. (cases)
The executors were under no duty to make payments and the trustees could not be compelled to
make payments prior to the distribution of the
trust property to them. The beneficiary's remedy
during that period is confined to asking the probate court to distribute a portion of the trust
funds to the trustee to be used for his support.
(cases) The rule preventing suit during this period relates to the time at which the trustees may
be compelled to make actual payment, however,
rather than to the date at which the right to support commenced. This, after the property was
distributed to the trustees, payment should have
been made for the respondent's support and maintenance commencing from the date of testatrix'
death." P. 590
We refer this court to the earlier portion of this
excellent Marre's decision, respecting testamentary intent and maintenance, this for the reason that in the
record, it is must be remembered that Judge Tuckett
had proferred to him 20 checks in favor of Mrs. Meyer,
immediately prior to testator's death, showing he had
maintained and supported her. (R. 469, 462, Tr. 20)
Keeping that proffer in mind, note the highest court of
California at page 589 of 114 P2d.
"The absence of an express direction that the
payments were to accrue from the date of her
death does not establish conclusively, however,
that the testatrix had no such intent. The intention of the testator is the determining factor
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(code) and that intent is to be gathered from the
instrument as a whole. (code, cases) The terms of
the will clearly indicate that this trust was created
for the specific purpose of providing maintenance
and support for the testatrix' grandson, the beneficiary herein. Indeed, if the will itself did not
refer to this bequest as a trust for maintenance
and support, the surrounding facts and circumstances would compel that conclusion. (case) The
evidence shows that respondent was the grandson
of the testatrix, that he had been supported by
her, and that she had definite plans for his future
education. Respondent was a minor at the date
of the execution of the will and at the date of the
testatrix' death, and this trust is the only provision made for the respondent in the will. Under
like circumstances it has been held that the payments under such a trust for support and maintenance were intended to accrue from the date of
testator's death. In Estate of Dare, 235 P 725,
729 this court stated the rule which we think
governs the present case; 'B~~ both reason and
authority we are compelled to the conclusion that
the respondent's right to the income to be derived
from the trust properties must be held to have
relation to the death of the testatrix. As to the
reason of the situation, it would seem to follow
that if, as we hold, the provision in said will and
in the trust clauses thereof were intended by the
testatrix to be in the nature of bequests for the
maintenance of her adopted daughter who, as has
been shown-had theretofore been supported and
maintained by her adopting parents during their
lifetime, such intention ought to have relation to
a time from and after the death of the testatrix,
since by that means only could continuity of such
rnaintenance be assured!"
Please note the decision in that case follows with a disSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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cussion of when interest on the sum begins. Supported
by strong authority in New York and Massachusetts, the
California court says interest accrues as of the date of
death, and not of distribution. It has been codified in
California, as well as in Utah!
It is a little difficult, to say the least, for us to see
the pertinance of appellants' reference to WOODLEY v.
WOODLEY, 117 P2 722. In that case "there is no trust
involved, but the rights of the parties rests upon an
"equitable charge." That case is in the lower appellate
court of California and the problems are not pertinent.
It seems amazing that appellants' brief does not come to
the issue, in the face of such overwhelming a,uthority.
Even this case finds an equitable charge on land passing
by will, subject to an obligation to pay $50 per month
during annuitant's lifetime. And it appears the rule was
followed that the right to receive accrued as of the date
of death! Appellants here do not sight a single authority,
Utah or otherwise, to show strength to their unsupportable argument.
The PLATT and MARRE'S estate cases, supra, are
a full and complete refutation to the claims of appellants,
and fully support Judge Tuckett for affirmation. This
court must follow those cases to be consistent with In
re LOWE'S ESTATE, supra, its own decision since
1926, that ought not to be altered without good reason.
These California decisions should be consulted on
the argument as to whether or not the bequests are in
the nature of annuities. Mr. Pierpont admonished the
trustee not to sell assets at a sacrifice. This did not make
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precatory the mandatory vesting of the rights of Mrs.
Meyer under section 7 (i). (R. 14) But the rights vested,
subject to administration, marshalling the fund, with the
instruction that if any amounts were reduced or suspended during liquidation, "any so resulting deficiencies
in monthly payments shall be made up." (R. 15) Mrs.
Meyer is one of those monthly annuitants. She did not
object to orderly liquidation, nor avoidance of quick
sale to take care of her. She patiently waited as her
brother asked that she do. And when the estate, rather
large, (R. 201) was in a position to be advantageously
distributed, her rights related back by statute, and by
the strongest of court decisions, to the date of Mr. Pierpont's death. The failure of appellants to produce a
single case to the contrary is revealing of the paucity.
2 Am. J ur. 819, #4 states, as to vesting:
"If by the terms of the will, the sum given
is payable in stated installments at definite periods in the future, the postponement of the payment is presumed to be for the benefit of the
legatee, and the bequest VESTS immediately
upon the death of the testator. Therefor, the death
of the legatee at any time thereafter will not defeat the right of his administrator to recover the
entire sum bequeathed.
Also in 2 Am. J ur. 829, #24, that authority states
concerning time of accrual of payment:
"Likewise, where an annuity is given by will,
it begins to run from the death of the testator;
and ordinarily, the first yearly payment is not
due until the end of a year from the death, unless
there are circumstances or expressions in the will
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evidencing a different intention. If the annuity
is directed to be paid monthly, the first monthly
payment will be payable at the expiration of a
month after the testator's death."
In 1913 the California court held in WESTERN
PAC. RY. v. GOD·FREY, 36 P. 284:
"That the estate of a decedent vests in his
heir or devisees and legatees immediately upon
his death cannot be disputed ...
"Pending the administration the personal
representatives of the decedent are entitled to the
possession of the estate for the purposes of administration, but the title vests in the heirs or
devisees and legatees, subject only to the right of
possession of the personal representatives of the
decedent ...
"The legatee does not derive title from the
decree of distribution, but from the will, which
takes effect immediately upon the death of the
testator. The decree of distribution does not
create the title. It merely declares the title that
accrued under by the will."
To the same effect is the California case of LIGHTENBERG v. BURDELL, 281 P 518 at 525, 1929, quoting
and applying the same language.
The theory of appellants in their brief is that title
and rights to the monthly allowance to Mrs. Meyer did
not vest or accrue until after distribution; that in the
interim the property was vested in the executor, free of
obligation to Mrs. Meyer. At common law, this might be
true; but Utah and California have adopted a different
rule. Note the language of an annotation at 150 ALR 91:
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"Under the common-law doctrine title to personal property of a testator's estate generally
vests in the executor upon his appointment, and
he has the absolute right to dispose of :· · . In
some jurisdiction, however, as for example, California, both real and personal property generally
descend directly to the beneficiary, with a qualified right in the personal representative, who
holds it for the purposes of administration more
like a receiver than like a common-law executor.
The title is not in him, nor has he the power of
disposal, save by order of the court."
The annotation then cites MURPHY v. CROUSE, 66
P 971, 972. That case enunciates the doctrine quoted, and
it is clearly in point here. The appellants in this case
held all of the testator's property, first as executor, and
then as residuary legatee in connection with trust powers.
It is in the latter that Mrs. Meyer is entitled to take
her annuity. In what capacity did Tracy-Collins Trust
Co. hold said property: with common-law powers with
an "absolute right to dispose of it" or "with a qualified
right . . . for the purposes of administration more like
a receiver than a common-law executor~" In the Murphy
case, supra, the highest court of California held in 1901
that:
"The rule never prevailed in this state. Here
both real and personal property descend directly
to the heir, or to the beneficiary named in the will
with a qualified right in the personal representative, who holds it for the purposes of administration more like a receiver than like a common-law
executor. The title is not in him, nor has he the
power of disposal, save by order of the court.
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fornia, and Utah has picked up the basic·California practice. The Utah statute disposes of the question entirely if
the payments to Mrs. Meyer are in the nature of an annuity. That we will discuss later under an appropriate
head. Assuming the payments to be .an annuity, and it is,
the statute puts Tracy-Collins Trust Co. in exactly the
status as the California court declares: that comparable
to a receiver, "with a qualified right" to administer.
Certainly the long list of duties enumerated by counsel
at page 14 of their brief shows the nature of receivership
functions. In a large estate such as the testators' these
marshalling functions had to be accomplished, as he foresaw, and made provisions for. And by so functioning,
the trust company status does not shift. The testator
willed that caution be exercised in converting the estate
in to a condition to make distribution. He provided that
no haste be employed in selling, converting. But he
showed his clear intention to have the trustee function
according to the Utah statute; and if payments to Mrs.
Meyer were "reduced or suspended, it is my desire that
when funds become available, any so resulting deficiencies
in monthly payments shall be made up.'' (R. 15) How
could the testator have been more explicit in showing that
it was "$100 per month during her lifetime" that should
be paid to Mrs. Meyer~ (R. 14) Note there are but two
provisions in the long will for monthly payments. Mrs.
Meyer gets one of these.
The right of Tracy-Collins to convert the estate into
cash so as to meet the annuity payment requirements
is kin to receivership. The right to receive $100 per month
during her lifetime vested in Mrs. Meyer at the time of
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testator's death, subject only to the orderly instructions
not to "sacrifice in order to obtain funds." He even goes
further and instructs the trustee to invade principal if
income is insufficient to meet the monthly schedule during the lifetime of Mrs. Meyer. (R.14)
Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Rawle's 3rd Ed. under
"Legacy" at page 1905 treats the question of whether
and when the legacy vests. Several authorities are cited
there, among the old Massachusetts case of Eldridge v.
Eldredge, 1852, 9 Cushings 516, saying:
"If the time of payment merely be postponed,
and it appear to be the intention of the testator
that his bounty should immediately attach, the
legacy is of the vested kind; ... "
It is clear here that Mrs. Meyer's legacy was to be "during her life time.''
This could never be honorably construed to mean on a
contingency or at some future time during her life time.
SUSPENSION OF PAY11:ENT OF MON'THLY SUMS:
It is implicated in the will that the testator instructed the trustee to husband 1the assets and only sell when
no sacrifice of value would deplete the estate. Para. 7 (k)
of the will. (R. 15) This provision does not divest Mrs.
Meyer of her legacy, annuity. It expressly is reserved
that if the mothly sum is proportionately reduced or
suspended, "it is my desire that when funds become
available, any so resulting deficiencies in monthly payments shall be made up.'' The Massachussets court
cons trued a complicated publisher's will in PARKI-IURT.S v. GINN, 117 NE 202 ,at 207 and stated:
1
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'' ... it is plain that the purpose of the testator
was to give to her something to add to her enjoyment of life and not merely to constitute a fund
for the benefit of her heirs or legatees ... The
crucial words of gift so far as concerns time is
in effect that these legacies shall be payable
only .after the·re is an adequate reserve to support
the payment of all annuities and gifts of income ... "
1

Apply the same rule of reason to Mr. Pierpont, and
it is clear that he intended and provided for one of hi~
two only full sisters "$100 per month during her lifetime." She could not enjoy it after she was dead. It
would cease. If it were nuuecessarily with-held from
her during administration, she could no t enjoy it or live
on it ''during her lifetime.'' The testator expressly
required that the trustee, in so husbanding 'the assets,
to make up any reduced or suspended monthly payment,
and not as appellants argue, denude her, expropriate
her, or destroy her annui1ty! What .are the crucial words
of "time'' in Pierp·ont's will~
1

Let it be remembered that there were only two sisters
of the tes tator. Note the way in which he took care of
Florence P. Taggart. (Para. 3, sub. (g) page 1) of the
will: he gave a specific, cash sum of $1000 to her, provided that if Mrs. Tagg.art be not living ''on the date
of distribu tion of my estate then in that event said
legacy shall lapse and my executor shall disburse the
said sum of $1000 to Alice Taggart, my niece." (R. 11)
The record does not disclose the entire family picture of
the sisters, Mrs Taggart, bu t it is cle.ar that the testator
was aware of time to be consumed in administration,
1

1

1
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and wanted to be sure that either the sister, Florence
P. Taggart, or his favorite niece by her, be taken care
of. The treatment of Mrs. Meyer, the only other full
sister, must be considered .alongside. In her .Answer to
Petition for rehearing (R. 366) she shows that "She
is 78 years of age. Her health is poor. She is in desperate need of the annuity . . . " .Also in her Protest
respecting rehearing, at page 347 of the record, she
states : ''Mrs. Meyer is old and infirm. She needs the
money her brother, the deceased, set up and provided
for her.'' These allegations were never answered nor
disputed on the record, and s'tands admitted for purpose
of this hearing. She is now 79. Obviously her health
could not have been improved at her age. That she was
provided for by a loving brother in his will, and that
the appellants have obstructed her receipt 'Of sums willed
to her amounting to over $3,600.00 for more than five
years now, is cause for this court to find that her condition has worsened, and that the delay would further
make her ill. The language in PARKHURST v. GINN
supra quoted is re.al. The $3,600.00 should not be so
long delayed in coming as to only benefit her estate
and children. It was the aged and ailing sister, Mrs.
Meyer, that Pierpont clearly wanted to benefit, and that
''during her lifetime'' and not too long delayed, without
making up the deficit! Mr. Pierpont theoretically

pr~

ferred Mrs. Meyer to her sister, Mrs. Taggart, for Mrs.
Meyer would only have to live for 10 months to have
the equivalent of the sister, Mrs. Taggart. It does not
lie for the appellants, nor this court, to change the
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expressed intention of the testator, to take c.are of Mrs.
Meyer during her lifetime.

THE PROF'ERRED EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE OF INTENT:
The testa!tor took care of her prior to his death.
This cannot be disputed. Mrs. Meyer's counsel moved
the court at the time of the last hearing as follows:
''I move the court to continue this hearing
in order that testimony be taken, respecting testamentary intent . . . I would like the record to
show that there has been shorwn to me this morning for the first time some eighteen or twenty
checks, signed by Mr. Thomas Pierpon t in favor
of Ella Meyer, most of them are a hundred
dollars; there are two or three that are two
hundred dollars - immediately preceeding his
death, and they followed in monthly sequence, and
will show a testamen tary intent ... I feel that
the court ought to have before it any extraneous
evidence, outside of the widow, that would point
to 'this. And I would like to have the court take
that into account in the disposition of this case.
I would be glad to not make any argument until
such time as there is a little more evidence before
the court. But I think all parties intended t'O
address themselves directly to the m.ai:Jters of law,
and I did not understand it was to take testimony.
I asked Mr. Gibbons if he would stipulate with
me this morning for the introduction 'Of these
checks into the record, .and he stated he felt he
would not be able to so do. So my 'Only recourse
is io make the motion which I have made.
1

1

1

THE COURT: Well, unless there is an ambiguity in the Will, can the court receive extrinsic
testimony~
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MR. LAMOREAUX: I understand, unless
there is an ambiguity, can the Court receive extrinsic ~testimony 1 Is that your question 1 I believe
that is the fact. I believe that is a correct statement, and I must preserve my right if the matter
should go on appeal. If the court deems there
is an ambiguity, I want an opportunity to present considerable extrinsic testimony.
Mr. GIBBONS: Your Honor, in that respect,
may I inquire whether it is the intention of Mr.
Lamoreaux if this Will is ambiguous on its face~
MR. LAMOREAUX: No, I do not believe
that. But I think the argument you have made,
Mr. Gibbons, introduced an element of ambiguity
which I am wholly unprepared to rebut. But I
don't leaveit exclusively on matter of .argument.
I am prepared to presen't evidence if the court
believes there is an ambiguity ...
THE COURT: Well, the Court might say
this: If the court determines there is an ambiguity, I assume that the eourt will permit you to
put on testimony.
MR. LAMOREAUX: That will be satisfactory with me, Your Honor." (Tr. 20)
The court took the n1atter, after long argument,
under advisement for the second tilne under the rehearing. It received authorities. In entering its final Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, i1t referred expressly to the 1notion of l\[r. Lamoreaux, and the proffer
of the several checks. (R. 462. 469) The court in effect
found there was no .an1biguity within the ·w-ill. It expressly found:
''That 'the said will becmne effective as of
the date of the death of the testator and that the
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trust provisions and the will became effective as
of that date. That there is nothing in the will
to indicated that the testator intended to postpone
the payments provided for in Paragraph Seventh
(i) of the will untill the estate was distributed
to the trustee." (R. 470)
There was and is no ambiguity as to Mrs. Meyer.
The offer of the checks amply saves the record, and :this
court must take into account that proffered evidence as
proving that the testator had practiced the annui ty principle with Mrs. Meyer for 18 months prior to his death,
and that he in tended to so continue it after his death.
The checks are exceilent extrinsic evidence of a testamentary intent, and certainly confirm the clear interpretation given of 'the will, so far as Mrs. Meyer is concerned, of Judge Tuckett's finding there was clear intent
for the gift to take efefct as ofthe date of death. As
Mrs. Meyer's counsel advised the court,
1

1

''But if there is ,any question of testamen tary
intent, the matter could be set down to hear
those things . . . Bu t I still feel that the matter
should be handled as a matter of law, and could
well be." (Tr. 6)
1

1

Mr. Gibbons stated:

" ... the provisions of Mr. Pierpont's Will are
clear and unambiguous, and that his intention,
therefore, is to be determined from the Will itself.
For that reason, it is not contemplated by us that
we will introduce any evidence in this matter.''
(Tr. 5)
The record was made without extrinsic exidence except
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ment and decision was made on the will itself, and that
rightly. Only if this court holds there is ambiguity that
might be cleared by extrinsic testimony, should the decision of the lower court be disturbed. Appellants at
no time suggested they had any extrinsic evidence. The
only offer is that of Mrs. Meyer in confirmation of the
interpretation given by the court. We do not wish to
open the record for further testimony. But if the court
has any re.al doubt that would upset the decision of the
lower court, then Mrs. Meyer has adequately preserved
her standing to bring extrinsic evidence to bear on testamentary in:tent, not otherwise.
STATUTORY HISTORY:
The sections of the Utah statute declaring "Legacies
are due .and deliverable at the expiration of one year
after the testator's decease. Annuities commence at the
testator's death,'' were taken verbatum from the California statute. The legislative history of that statute is
st.ated in Deering's California Codes, Probate, page 333
at No. 162. The California legistlature changed the old
section that read precisely as does the Utah statute, so
as to become more explicit as to ,,~hen annuities are
vested. Note how the addition for clarity is added, shown
here in italics:

"162 . . . Annuities commence at the testator's death and are due at the end of the annual,
monthly or other specified pedod."
The California statue then goes on in the same paragraph, showing that even though there be a trust created
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by will, such as the trust in the case at bar, nevertheless,
interest is to accrue on each .anniversary of the decedent's death. This demonstrates the fallacy of appelants'
argument. California ·codified the practice and sound
policy on which the Utah statue w.as founded. Here is
the language that follows the quoted portion immediately
above:
"162 ... Whenever an annuitant, legatee of
a legacy for maintenance or benefiJdary of a t.rust
may be entitled to periodic payments or trust
income commencing at the testator's death, he
shall be entitled to interest at 4% per annum on
the amount of any unpaid .accumulations of such
payments or income held by the executor or
administrator on each anniversary of the decedent ''s death, computed from the date of such
anniversary." (emphasis added)
California like Utah vests the annuity at the time
of testator's death. There is no question about that.
Counsel in appellant's brief makes the specious, untrue
statement at page 18 of their brief : ''The trust estate
did not come into existence until the testator's residual
estate was distributed to the trustee on October 18, 1957. ''
This statement is simply not true. In paragraph Seventh
of the will the testator set up the terms of the trust that
included all property ''in which I may be interested at
the time of my death . . . '' The trustee was also the
executor, possessed of full po.-wer over all of the estate,
trust or otherwise. Under the terms of the amended, fuller
and more explicit California statute .above, the trust has
nothing to do with fixing the time when the right to the
annuity vests. This is codifying of the rule of law that
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has been followed through the land and in England, and
to postpone such a vesting date would not only violate
the Utah statute but it would do violence to the clear
testamentary intent of Mr. Pierpont, to say nothing of
establishing a rule of law pregnant with possibilities for
abuse by executors that could devour an estate before
trust by time, expenses, wido·w's allowance, and other
devises.
As it is, the executor took three years to reduce
the estate to a form in which it chose to present the trust
aspects to the lower court. (R. 273) It is well to examine
appellants ''Enclosure A'' and the arguments at page 23
of the brief. Suppose they had taken rightfully or
wrongfully as many as eight years to marshal and convert the estate for distribution, what could and would
have happened to the elderly sister of the testator, Mrs.
Meyer, during that time~ She could have died of starvation, but her loving brother had other ideas. He stated
clearly that she should receive $100.00 per month during
her lifetime.'' True it is that the testator was prudent
in instructing the executor to ''suspend further payments until funds become available ... through orderly
sale of all or part of the principal assets,'' but he follows
with clear and unambiguous words that meet the test
of the California statute as extended, and the Utah
statute as it has existed for years, that:
''In the event any payments specified to be
made by my Trustee shall be so reduced or suspended, it is 1ny desire that when funds become
available, any so resulttng deNciencies in monthly
payments shall be made up."
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Thus the will agrees with the California statute that the
right to receive the fixed sum of $100.00 per month
vested on the date of testator's death; that if not paid
then, the sum would have to be made up. And note
the peculiar language in Seven (k) refers only to ''deficiencies in monthly payments.,., (R. 15) How many
annuities or legacies called for monthly pa.yments? Only
two. Mrs. Meyer and the widow. It is clear that the
testator had in mind provision for Mrs. Meyer ''during
her lifetime.'' To postpone the vesting or accruing of
Mrs. Meyer's annuity until such time as the executor
saw fit to distribute the estate would be catastrophic to
her age. Attaching conditions tending to ''destroy estates
are not f.avored in law, and are construed strictly, and
generally all doubts are resolved against restrictions on
the use of the property of the grantee." GAFFER'S
ESTATE 5 NYS 2nd 678. ''Conditions of defeasance,
never suggested by her brother.
POINT II
THE BEQUEST TO MRS. MEYER WAS IN THE TRUE
NA'TURE OF AN ANNUITY.

Appellants argue in their Point III that the bequest
to Mrs. Meyer is not an annuity. The contingencies
referred to respecting the widow are not .applicable to
Mrs. Meyer. Counsel predicate their argument that
''respondents do not have an absolute right that they
be made up,'' referring to the reduction or suspension
if funds are not readibly available in respect to selling
assets at a sacrifice. Judge Tuckett heard the theory
and was not impressed.
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At that argument (R. 14) appellants' counsel referred the court to the Utah case of In Re SEARS'
ESTATE 55 P 83 which no doubt assisted the trial
court in determining that the bequests were in the nature
of annuities.. Counsel does not suggest this court now
consult its own decision, precedent since 1898, and unchanged. There testator made provision for his wife,
sister, the latter to get $50.00 per month during her life.
A nurse was given money '' as soon as there shall be
sufficient,'' and by the payment of expenses, and the
two annuities, there was insufficient for the nurse. The
nurse persuaded the trial court to cut down the sister~
but this court reversed, holding:
''Each of the foregoing bequests constitute
an annuity, to continue during the life of the
legatee . . . The record shows ... that the estate
after payment of the debts, expenses of administration, and a monthly allowance to the widow,
which lasted about a year, was well-nigh exhausted ... that the sister and legatee . . . has received
nothing out of the estate, although at the time
of making the decree complained of, 12 months
had elapsed since the death of testate. It is
apparent that all the legacies cannot be paid, and
the question is who is entitled to preference under
the terms of the will, as between the legatees to
this controversy?
''It seems clear that the testator himself
indicated whoshould receive preference in such
a contingency . . . Next there is a provision for
his sister and her children. This is also quite
natural, because of the tender and affectionate
feelings which usually exist between brother and
sister. Then, after those who are entitled to his
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first and highest consideration have been provided for ... bequest to the nurse ... it cannot
be presumed that the testator intended that this
bequest to a stranger should, under any contingency, receive preference over those made to his
wife and sister. Such a presumption would be
opposed to the natural feeling or affection which
man has for his wife .and next of kin.

"The bequest to his sister was an annut1ty,
which commenced at the testator's {jeath while
the bequest to the nurse was a legacy which w.as
not due until one year after his death. Rev. St.
2815 ... ,,
The will stated that payments would commence with
the date of testator's death. Pierpont's gift to Mrs.
Meyer is silent. But that silence does not dispose of
the case as grounds for this court declaring the gift·
to be an annuity. The laws of Utah at that time (Rev.
Stat. Utah No. 2815 was identical to 74-3-14 UCA 1953
and the court found the old statute made out an annuity.
The fact that the will itself specified the date of death
for payment is immaterial in view of the Utah statutes.
In leading California case In Re PLATT'S ESTA·TE,
131 P2d 825 at 828 the will did not specify the time
payments were to commence, but that court, along with
virtually .all others, stated :
''So as there is no express provision in the
will as to the date from which payment of income
shall accrue, under Section 160 of the Probate
Code the rights of both wife and son to income
under the trust accrue from the date of the testator's death."
In arguing our point number two on .annuities, may
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we say that implict in the authorities cited in point one
is the law pertaining to annuities. We advert primarily
to the arguments of appellants for answer, referring
the reader to point one for synthesis of the dual question
of vesting and annuities. The two are closely allied
in the cruses.
The prime statutory definition of annuity is in 743-1, DCA 1953:
" . . . (3) An annuity is a bequest of -certain
specified sums periodically; if the fund or property out of which they are payable fails, resort
may be had to the general assets as in case of
a general legacy.''
Counsel refers on page 26 of their brief to the definition
of annuity as it pertains to insurance. That is impertinent. We deal only with the probate definition, quoted
immediately above, it having but one prime requisite:
that is for a certain specified sum, periodically. The will
at paragr.aph 7 (i) is certain. It specifies $100.00 per
month "during her lifetime.'' It also goes further than
need be, under the Utah statute, and requires the invasion of principle if income is insufficient. Thus the
statute of Utah just quoted, as to its final clause, is
not even needed to give certainty.
Counsel goes to p.aragraph Seven (k) to create
doubt as to certainty, and even argues on page 30 of
their brief that Mrs. Meyer could not sue to force a
sale. -'Suffice it to say she did not. She did not presume
to rifle the estate, not force uneconomic sacrifice. She
waited patiently, only to have her w.aiting rewarded
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with a prolonged and costly defense of her absolute
rights, once the estate was liquidated and in a position
to distribute. It was wise for the testator Pierpont to
instruct no haste in marshalling the assets. But the
intent is absolute and clear in the will: first, that Mrs.
Meyer was to get under 7 (i) a sum certain during her
lifetime; and second, that if in prudence, monthly payments were reduced or suspended, they shall be made
up, in 7 (k). It is impossible to mistake the construction.
It is clear. It was not drawn by amateur counsel. Had
the draftsman intended to postpone payments to Mrs.
Meyer, it would have been easy to carve out an exception for the then existing pertinent statute, 74-3-14 UCA
1953, but all that appears is the wisdom of careful
liquidation, holding out the instruction that if "payments required to be made" were suspended, they shall
be made up. Again note that 7 (k) only refers to
"monthly payments" and Mrs. Meyer and the widow
are the only set up for monthly payments. When the
construction given an instrument by a trial court appe.ars
to be resonable and consistent with the intent of the
party making it, appellate courts will not substitute
another interpretation even though it seems tenable.
Here, any substitute interpretation would be stretching
intent, and would be villainous.
Appellants say Mrs. l\1:eyer would have no remed~r
had she sued for a more speedy liquidation and payment
to her of the annuity. They argue ''respondents do
not have an absolute right that they (payments) be made
up.,_, (p 30, their brief) It may be only a qualified
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right, qualified only by the caution of orderly liquidation. We do not split hairs. Had the trustee or the
probate court been slothful in its liquidation, and undertaken to unnecessarily prolong that process, certainly
this court under its rules concerning Extraordinary
Writs would have the power to step in and discipline;
the rights of Mrs. Meyer were qualified only to the
extent of waiting for sales, conversion into cash without
sacrifice. This is sensible, but is no grounds for appellants arguing the need for .an ''absolute right'' to receive
the annuity. This court did not mind finding In Re
SEARS' ESTATE, supra, that the sister, who had not
been paid anything within a year of the testator's death,
still had a vested right to receive the annuity as of
the date of testator's death. It has been unfair for the
trustee to so long withold the annuity, since it had the
funds. The trustee has yielded to the pressures of the
residuary legatees ; instead of remaining neutral .as a
trustee should, it has taken sides with the grand children
and others, remote from the testator's sister, whom
Mr. Pierpont had maintained, and wanted to continue
to help during her old .age. As to Mrs. Meyer, there
never has been a legitimate controversy
·The complete answer to appellant's argument concerning a right to compel payment before distribution
is set forth In Re MARRE 'S ESTATE, 114 P2d 591 at
590 under 11-13 sub heads, quoted hereinbefore. Space
does not allow repetition. (see pageS ____ of this brief)
~
'

.

,,

/
,.<'

Appellants' reference to precatory words in paragraph 7 (k) is specious. The whole idea of suspension
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or reduction of monthly payments is predicated on the
precatory use of the word "may" on the fourth line of
7(k). Note that on line 2 thereof, the testator has used
the mandatory, unprecatory words "payments required."
This proves the stronger intent in par.a:graph 7 (i)
where the strongest word in the law, "shall" is unqualified, as to the intent that his sister shall receive $100
per month during her lifetime. Precatory words may be
found in 7 (k), but they relate to the discretion of
postponement, not the ultimate right of Mrs. Meyer
to receive. " . . . resulting deficiencies in monthly payments shall be made up,'' are anything but precatory they manifest a determination to maintain those of his
loved-ones who had monthly payments, not those that
came after! Certainly the trustee had qualified right
to postpone payments; but with the qualified right rode
the unqualified right to have the difficiencies ''made up.''
This type of a will is to be encouraged, but certainly
it would make bad law for this court to graft into
precedent law the hair-splitting and ambiguity implicit
in such contention of appellants.
Appellants are confused. The best way to unconfuse
them is for this court to follow the California Supreme
Court In Re MARRE'S EST.&TE, supra, 114 P2 586 and
since followed widely. We have quoted earlier in this
brief from that excellent decision. In that case it was
likewise .argued that annuities were not created by the
will because no date of ·commencing payments was stated.
The court said :
"'The absence of an express direction that the
payments were to accrue from the date of her
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death does not establish conclusively that the
testatrix had no such intent .... The terms of the
will clearly indicated that this trust was created
for the specific purpose of providing maintenance
and support for the testatrix' grandson ... Indeed, if the will itself did not refer to this bequest
as a trust for maintenance and support, the
surrounding facts and circumstances would compel that conclusion.''
WOODLEY v. WOODLEY 117 P2d 722, cited by
appellants at page 29, their brief, relates to an annuity
which is a charge on land, .and not applicable. Besides
it is a lower court decision; it does not help or hurt
the respondent's position at bar otherwise than to dignify the argument that annuitants have vested rights that
may he vindicated in the courts.
Appellants cite 95 C. J. S. 803 on precatory words.
Note the same authority at page 800, keeping in mind
that the precatory words, if such they be in 7 (k) of the
will, .are addressed to the trustee, not to the right of
Mrs. Meyer to receive monthly payments. Her right
is preserved by the words ' (payments required to be
made'' on the second line thereof. The precatory words
refer to the method of liquidation; they are suggestions
to the trustee, and in no way unvest !irs. !ieyer. Line
13 of 7 (k) illuminates again the intent that the trustee
shall 1neet the payinents specified in this ·will."
Appellants' brief has not completely leveled with
the court on page 32, line 3 of its atte1npt to elucidate
the precatory. It is singular that the most important
word in the paragraph - "shall was ommitted. It is
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tants. Possibly counsel did not realize it was there.
He assumes that in its place a word like "may" exists.
Not so. His argument falls with his failure to find the
word! Substitute a precatory word in its place, and
the finding this court must affirm is self evident.
In re PIT·TOCK 'S WILL cited at page 33 of appellants' brief is beside the point.
Counsel trifle with the manner of the lower court
in finding the bequests are '' in the nature of annuities.''
The learned trial judge used a common manner of
speech, writing. Please notice how the California court
uses the same expression on line 18 of p:age 590 In Re
MARRE'S ESTATE, 114 P2d 591, supra. Counsel quibbles.
74-2-25 UCA 1953 raises a presumption that Mrs.
Meyer had a vested right to receive her annuity as of
the time of death. At page 36 of their brief, appellants
admit respondent Meyer is supported by a presumption.
Appellants have utterly failed to rebut the presumption.
The will itself confirms tha.t the presumption is wholly
warranted.
The only discretion trustee had, in respect to respondent Mrs. Meyer, was to take precautions in an
orderly liquidation. All of their talk on this subject is
unworthy. There is no discretion when Mr. Pierpont
said ''shall be made up,'' not may.
Finally, appellants' brief adverts on page 37 to the
duty of the trustee to pay the annuity to Mrs. Meyer

or to her estate. Had she died prior to distribution,
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counsel did not say her estate could not collect ! The
authorities treated herein established the vesting as of
date of testator's death and preserved the rights that
Mrs. Meyer's estate could realize. Mr. Pierpont recognized this by paragraph 9 of the will. That further
proves his intent to take care of her during her lifetime.
It was and is a vested right that cannot be postponed.
Only the manner of making payment is affected by par-agraph 7 (k), not the right.
POINT III
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING INTEREST
SHOULD BE PAID FROM DATE OF DEATH.

Appellants' counsel argue on page 38 of their brief
that the court erred in affixing interest on the annuity.
In that connection, the clear error of appellants is
exhibited. The brief say at page 38:
''In any event, the award is erroneous as
to any payments for the period prior to August
29, 1957, since it is within the discretion of the
trustee as to whether any such payments shall
be made up."
Nothing could he further frmn the truth.
To get at this question, as .a matter of law, which
appellants have skirted, citing no authority, let us look
at the cases on interest accruing on annuities. The
authorities we are concearned with all .agree that interest
accrues on an annuity of this kind!
The learned trial court required the payment of
interest to Mrs. Meyer, and presumably he relied on the
lTtah statute, and the general law. He was right. What
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is the difference between an annuity and a legacy? All
legacies are not annuities, but all annuities are legacies!
Hence, when the Utah statute expressly reaches out
and employs the language of "legacies for maintenance"
Mrs. Meyer is clearly within the Utah statute. But we
do not rely on the Utah statute alone.
Note what 2 Am J ur. 829 No. 25 has to say about Interest
upon arrearages :
"In this country the weight of authority supports the ·conclusion that interest upon arrear ages
of annuities is recoverable from the time the
installments of the annuity becomes due and payable.''
The statute of Utah requires the payment of interest.
74-3-15 says:
"Legacies bear interest from the time when
they are due and payable, except that legacies for
maintenance or to the testator's widow, bear interest from the testator's decease."
Mrs. Meyer was given a legacy in the nature of an annuity. It was clearly for "maintenance." All inferences
point positively in that direction. This court is bound
to accept the proffer of proof that for 18 to 20 months
before his death, he maintained her with payments of at
least $100 per month. (Tr. 20) Is a legacy, as used in
74-3-15 an annuity~ Certainly it is. Bouvier defines a
legacy to be "A gift of personal property by last will
and testament. A gift or disposition in one's favor by a
last will. The term is more commonly applied to a bequest of money or chattels ... A direction to the executor
to support and maintain a person during his life gives
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him a legacy." There can be no doubt but that an annuity
is within the generic term used in 74-3-15, thus requiring
the payment of interest, and from the time they are due
and payable, which is in 74-3-14 UGA 1953: "Annuities
commence at the testator's decease." The trial court was
aware of this and hence made his decree accordingly. This
should by all means be affirmed.
Note that the California statute since 1931 has read:
"General pecuniary legacies, if not paid prior
to the first anniversary of the testator's death,
bear interest thereafter at the rate of 4% per
annum. Annuities commence at the testator's
death and are due at the end of the annual, monthly or other specified period. Whenever an annuitant, legatee of a legacy for maintenance or
beneficiary of a trust may be entitled to periodic
payments or trust income commencing at the
testator's death, he shall be entitled to interest at
4% per annum on the amount of any unpaid accumulations of such payments or income held by
the executor or administrator on each anniversary of the decedent's death, computed from the
date of such anniversary." (See legislative history of section.)
Deering's Calif. Codes, Probate, 333 No. 162.
California codified its practice in the courts. Utah's
statutes are not in conflict, and are in effect to the same
effect, without the interest rate stated.
When interest attaches by statute, that of itself
proves the vesting of the legacy, annuity.
Please refer to Jarman on Wills, 7th Ed., vol. 2, page
1108 for reference to the English authorities. Lord Harwicke is there quoted as saying that "where the accumuSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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lation of arrears has been occasioned by the misconduct
of the party bound to pay" that interest should always
accrue. In that same work, Jarman at page 1024 specifies the different kinds of legacies, helpful in classification in this case. That eminent authority states, at page
1107 of that work, respecting the date annuities begin to
be payable:
"The general rule is that an annuity given by
will is to commence from the date of the testator's
death; that is to say, if no time for payment is
fixed, the first payment is to be made at the expiration of one year from the testator's death, but
if the testator directs that the annuity shall be
paid, say, monthly, the first payment is to be made
at the end of a month after the testator's death.''
2 Jarman, Wills, 7th Ed. 1107.
The Utah statute has picked up this old and ancient rule.
That we are dealing with an ancient and established
precedent, see the annotation at 10 ANNO. CASES, 339
with this statement, backed up by a host of authorities:
"By the weight of authority, interest upon
the arrearages of annuities is recoverable. Thus it
has been held that interest is recoverable from
the time the installments of the annuity become
due and payable ... Where an annuity has been
given for the support and maintenance of the annuitant, interest upon the arrearages must be allowed.
Let it be observed that Mrs. Meyer has always contended for interest, and is not guilty of laches. See her
pleadings at pages 347, 367 of the record.
The Supreme Court of California in re HUBBELL'S
ESTATE, 1932, 15 P. 2d 503 observed:
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"We are inclined to the view that interest is
due on a legacy, not as a penalty for nonpayment
or default in payment, but as a part of or and
accretion to the legacy itself."
To apply such a rule of reason in this case does no injury
to anyone because the trustees has had the corpus of the
estate out at interest for the benefit of all of the residuary legatees. To deprive Mrs. Meyer of her just share
of that interest would be inequitable, and benefit those
whom Mr. Pierpont did not intend to favor, as his sister's
loss. His intent to make up any delayed payment is proof.
The Utah Supreme Court in Re SEAR'S ESTATE,
55 P 83 found that
"The bequest to his sister was an annuity
which commenced at the testator's death..."
Thus, under 74-3-15-U·CA 1953, interest had to accrue
from date of death of Mr. Pierpont.
This court In Re LOWE'S ESTATE, 249 P. 128
found that
" . . all testamentary dispositions are presumed to vest at the testator's death."
There is no other answer.
In Re MARRE'S ESTATE, 114 P2 591 gives a
strong treatment on the subject, finding that interest
must be paid on "legacies for support and maintenance~'
such as we have here.
In re PLATT'S ESTATE, 131 P2 825 the California
court in that classic leading case holds :
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"Interest, when payable upon a legacy, is a
part of or an accretion to the legacy itself. (cases)
Legacies for maintenance or to the testator's
widow bear interest from the testator's death; all
other legacies are due one year after the testator's
death and bear interest from that time. (code &
case) Under this rule, the income which accrued
to the wife during the period between the date of
death and the date of distribution bears interest
from the date such income was received by the
executors."
The RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS, second, revised
edition, at topic 234 is illuminatative on the question of
interest.
The strongest argument in favor of allowing interest
is in the will itself. By paragraph 7 (i) the testator showed
that he did not rely on income alone but of the corpus of
his property as grounds for payment to Mrs. Meyer. He
stated clearly that if the income was insufficient, then the
principle should be invaded so as to get her required
payment of $100 per month during her lifetime. 7 (k)
wherein payments to be paid up if suspended, shows the
clear intent that she should have the sum certain. If
this court continues to adhere to its rule that annuities
vest as of the time of death of the testator, then the
requirement of the trustee to pay the legal rate of 6%
interest from date of death must apply. That counsel
argues that there was no income for a time in the estate
is inapplicable because of the mandate to pay the $100
from corpus if income was not sufficient. This puts the
right to receive interest on the footing of any other obligation in Utah that goes unpaid. We deal here with a
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utes require payment of interest from the time when they
are due. (74-3-15 UCA 1953) There can be no escape.
Appellants predicate their entire argument against
interest on their being a discretion to pay the annuity
if and when the probate was concluded. This is falacious,
as has been argued in the main part of this brief. If the
sum provided in the will vested at time of death, interest
commences then. The trial court so found and computed.
It was right.
CONCLUSION
Mrs. Ella Meyer trusts that this court will affirm
the lower court, and make available to her while she is
yet alive, the gift with interest, bestowed by her loving
brother. She will not be long with us, but her rights are
real and vested. May they be vindicated in the name of
good law for the books.
Respectfully,
WARWICK C. LAMOREAUX
ALLEN HOWE,

Attorneys for Respondents
415 So. 2nd East
Salt Lake City, Utah
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